South Carolina Law Review
Volume 15

Issue 3

Article 6

1963

Conflict of Laws--Lex Fori in the Fields of Torts
Michael H. Quinn

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Quinn, Michael H. (1963) "Conflict of Laws--Lex Fori in the Fields of Torts," South Carolina Law Review:
Vol. 15 : Iss. 3 , Article 6.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss3/6

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Quinn: Conflict of Laws--Lex Fori in the Fields of Torts

CASE COMMENT

CONFLICT OF LAWS -

Lex Fori in the Field of Torts

LEX LOCI DELICTI
In the American law of conflicts, two rules deemed elementary are: (1) the law of the place of the wrong determines
whether a person has sustained a legal injury,, and (2) that
for a tort action to be maintainable, there must be a good
cause of action existent under the laws of the place where
the alleged tort occurred.2
In wrongful death actions, the traditional American view
has been that the lex loci delicti determines the right to sue
for such wrongful death,3 who is entitled to the amount recoverable, 4 and the amount which may be beneficially recovered."
This view has been predicated on the theory of "vested
rights" as set forth by Mr. Justice Holmes in Slater v. Mexican
Nat'l R.R.: "But as the only source of the obligation is the
law of the place of the act, it follows that that law determines
not merely the existence of the obligation, but equally determines its extent."' 6
The rejection of the theory is said to have begun as early
as 1923 in an opinion by Mr. Justice Learned Hand to the
effect that:
... no court can enforce any law, but that of its own
sovereign, and, when a suitor comes to a jurisdiction
foreign to the place of the tort, he can only invoke an
obligation recognized by that sovereign. A foreign sovereign under civilized law imposes an obligation of its
1. 11 AM. Jun. Conflict of Laws §182 (1937);

FLICT OF LAWs §378 (1934).
2. LEFLAR, CONFLICT OF LAWS

§378 (1934);

RESTATEMENT, CON-

RESTATEMENT,

ibid. at

§379. For definition of the place of the wrong as being in the state where
the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes
place see RESTATEMENT, ibid. at §377.
3. LEFLAR, id. at §114; RESTATEMENT, op. cit. suprat note 1, §391.
4. Pennsylvania Ry. v. Levine, 263 Fed. 557 (2d Cir. 1920); Free v.
Southern Ry., 73 S.C. 57, 58 S.E. 952 (1907) ; RESTATEMENT, op. cit. supra
note 1, §393.
5. Northern Pacific Ry. v. Babcock, 154 U.S. 190, 38 L.Ed. 958 (1894);
Lauria v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 241 Fed. 687 (E.D.N.Y. 1917);
LEFLAR, op. cit. supra note 2, §174; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS §88
(1949) ; RESTATEMENT, Op. cit. supra note 1, at §§391(d), 412.
6. Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126, 48 L.Ed. 900, 903
(1904) ; accord, Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. v. George, 223 U.S. 354, 58
L.Ed. 997 (1914); Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 48 L.Ed. 1067 (1904).
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own as nearly homologous as possible to that arising in
the place where the tort occurred.7
While the doctrine of "vested rights" has been the object
*f criticism by both judges and scholars,s the role it has
played, particularly in actions concerning measure of damages,
has indeed been significant. This is well illustrated by a decision in the California Supreme Court arising from an automiobile accident between two California citizens in Mexico.
The court in upholding the limitation on damages as provided
by Mexican law stated that: ".... the measure of damages
is inseparably connected to the cause of action, and cannot be
severed therefrom." 9

Other courts, finding this view to be to their dissatisfaction
have, in attempts to avoid the rule of lex loci delicti, often
Tesorted to various and sometimes rather specious reasoning
to justify their decision in applying the law of the forum.' 0
This has been accomplished by characterizing a transaction
as a question of contract law;" by applying the law of the

place of the alleged harmful conduct, rather than that of the
actual harm as the real wrong;12 and, more frequently, by
applying lex fori as a matter of procedure rather than substance.' 3
7. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 307 F.2d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1962)
(dissent). Judge Kauffman, in his dissenting opinion, cites from the case
of Guinness v. Miller, 291 Fed. 769, 770 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 299 Fed. 538
(2d Cir. 1924), aff'd sub nom. Hicks v. Guinness, 269 U.S. 71, 70 L.Ed.
168 (1925); accord, Siegmann v. Meyer, 100 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1938).
8. Cavers, The Two "Local Law" Theories, 63 HARv. L. REV.822, 823,
n. 4 (1950) (for an explanation of the "vested rights" theory and the
criticism by Judge Learned Hand and Professor Cook leading to their
rejection of it); Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum,
58 COLUTm. L. REv. 964 (1958); see EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAws §4
(1962).
9. Victor v. Sperry, 163 Cal. App.2d 518, 329 P.2d 728 (1958) ; accord,
Stoltz v. Burlington Trans. Co., 178 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1949); Howard
v. Pulver, 329 Mich. 415, 45 N.W.2d 530 (1951); but cf. Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal.2d 859, 264 P.2d 944, 42 A.L.R.2d 1162 (1953).
10. See Childress, Toward the Proper Law of the Tort, 40 TEXs L.
REV. 336, 348 (1962); Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori in Conflict of Laws,
Exception or Rule?, 32 Rocxy MT. L. Ray. 13, 15 (1960).
11. Levy v. Daniels U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143
Atl. 163 (1928); cf. Graham v. Wilkins, 145 Conn. 34, 138 A.2d. 705

(1958).

12. See Vrooman v. Beach Aircraft Corp., 183 F.2d 479, 480 (10th
Cir. 1950) (dictum) (The court, in an action which arose from an airplane crash in Indiana, applied the law of Kansas, the place of the alleged
negligent conduct); Gordon v. Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mass. 1949),
aff'd, 178 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1949) (action involving alienation of affections); Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365
(1957).
13. Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal.2d 859, 264 P.2d 944, 42 A.L.R.2d 1162
(1953).
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CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
When the law of the forum is applied to an action based on
a foreign statute, the question presented is whether such
application is a violation of the Constitution of the United
States, namely the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, 14 and the full faith and credit clause.15 Most of the
controversy has centered around these two provisions. 16
DUE PROCESS

No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to what is, or
what is not, due process; rather the pattern of due process
is to be shaped out of the facts and circumstances of each case.
Originally the due process clause was held to control a
state's choice of law rules without regard to the contacts or
interests, however significant, of the forum state with the
transaction. In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge,17 the United
States Supreme Court held that Missouri could not apply her
own law to prevent the application of the paid-up value of a
Missouri insurance policy toward the repayment of a loan
agreement in accordance with a contract of lending. This,
the Court reasoned, was a separate transaction entered into
in New York and governed by her laws. Thus Missouri was
forbidden to substitute her laws for those of the place of the
making of the contract despite her interests in the transaction, in that both the insured and his wife, the plaintiff beneficiary, were residents of Missouri, and also, that at no time
during the transaction did the insured leave Missouri.
While the Dodge case has never been expressly overruled,
later decisions, difficult to reconcile with the view expressed
in Dodge, indicate that the Supreme Court has relaxed its
14.

". .

. nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law...."
15. Article IV, §1: "Full faith and credit shall be given in each state
to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state.
And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which
such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof."
16. See also, Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimintionin Con-

forf Lfe
Equ.
o.L.y.
otectio, 28e U.SC.
1(
(1914);
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. ieg,259 U.S. 209, 66 L.Ed. 90 (1922).
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standards in determining what constitutes such interest as
will allow the application of local law.18
The deciding factor in Home Ins. Co. v. Dick'9 was the interest of the forum state in the transaction in controversy.
The Court in its decision held that when a state, which has
no interest in the matter, applies its law to defeat rights asserted under the law of a foreign country, there is a denial of
due process. Thus it would appear that the converse of the
rule as laid down in Dick would be that when a state does
have substantial contacts and a legitimate interest in the
transaction, it may apply its own law without violation of
20
due process.
Following this rationale, the prevailing rule has come to be
that when the forum state has such a substantial contact with
the action as to constitute a legitimate interest, it may apply
its own law without violating the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, 2 ' even assuming the other state may
also have a similar interest. 22
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
While the forum state may meet the test of due process, it
still must contend with the requirements of the full faith and
credit clause.
It was perceived at an early age in the United States that
conflict of laws, dealing with both interstate and international
matters, as well as state interests, should not be left to the
uncontrolled discretion of the several states, so even the loose
18. E.g., Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 99 L.Ed.

74 (1954); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 89
L.Ed. 812 (1945); Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 87
L.Ed. 777 (1943).
19. 281 U.S. 397, 74 L.Ed. 926 (1930); compare Hoopeston Canning Co.
v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 316-317, 87 L.Ed. 777, 782 (1943).
20. See Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in a, State's
Choice of Law, 44 IowA L. REV. 449,455-456 (1959).
21. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 99 L.Ed. 74
(1954). The Court held that, as Louisiana had a legitimate interest in
safeguarding the rights of her citizens, she could apply her own law without violation of due process. Accord, State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v.
Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 89 L.Ed. 812 (1944); See generally Weintraub, id. at
450-468.
22. See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532,
550, 79 L.Ed. 1044, 1053 (1935); but cf. Weintraub, supra note 20 at
456-458 (to the effect that a state may have a substantial contact with
the occurrence, but that such contact was acquired so late that application
of state law would inject an element of unfairness, constituting a violation of due process).
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Articles of Confederation had a rudimentary full faith and
credit clause.23 Accordingly, the very purpose of our present
full faith and credit clause was to alter the status of the several states as independent sovereignties, each free to ignore
the obligations created by the laws and judicial proceedings
of the other states, and to make them into integral parts of
a single nation, throughout which certain rights and obliga24
tions would be recognized regardless of origin.
The full faith and credit clause, however, does not compel
a state to adopt any particular set of rules as conflict of laws.
It merely sets certain requirements which each state must
observe when asked to do so by a sister state,25 leaving the
states free to adopt rules of conflict of laws as they choose,26
subject to the full faith and credit clause and other constitu27
tional requirements.
In the case of statutes, the extra-territorial effect of which
Congress has not prescribed, where the policy of one state
statute comes into conflict with that of another, the necessity
of some accommodation of the conflicting interests becomes
imperative..2 8 This conflict, originally expressed as that betveen the policies of two states,29 is now described as that
between the policy of one state and "the strong unifying principle embodied in the full faith and credit clause looking
toward maximum enforcement in each state of the obligations
or rights
created or recognized by the statutes of sister
30
states.2
23. Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. Rnv.
581, 586 (1953), reprinted in ASS'N OF Am. LAw SCHOOLS, SELECTED READINGS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 255 (1956); see generally Radin, The Authenticated Full Faith and Credit Clause: Its History, 39 ILL. L. REv. (1944).
24. Milvaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-277, 80
L.Ed. 220, 228 (1935) (holding full faith and credit to judgments includes
judgment for taxes).
25. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 516, 97 L.Ed. 1211,
1215 (1953).
26. Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171, 61 L.Ed. 229 (1916).
27. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., supra note 25.
28. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 159-160, 89
L.Ed 812, 817 (1944), citing Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc.
Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547, 79 L.Ed. 1044, 1052 (1935); see generally
Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests
and the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 9 (1958) (that the major
uncertainty in the field of full faith and credit involves the extraterritorial effect that must be given to the statutes of sister states); Reese,
Full Faith and Credit to Statutes, the Defense of Public Policy, 19 U.
CHI. L. REv. 319 (1952).

29. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, id.
30. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611, 95 L.Ed. 1212, 1216 (1951).
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In resolving such conflicts, although with frequent disagreement among the members of the Court, permissive weighing
and balancing of the conflicting claims and interests, both
abroad and at the forum, has been approved in decisions by
3
the Supreme Court. '

This aspect of weighing and balancing or analyzing inthe
terests has proven to be a popular topic, with many of
advocating such. 32

scholars in the field of conflict of laws

Such an approach has provided the basis for decisions in
the field of workmen's compensation, 33 where however, it may
be conceded that as compensation acts were enacted with

special social and economic purposes in mind, greater freedom
has been and should be permitted in the process of extending
the scope of local laws to those who according to local theories
come within its protective coverage. 34 It has also been used
in such areas as insurance, 35 wrongful death actions,3 6 and

more recently in a case arising under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, in which the Court stated:

Where more than one state has sufficient contact with
the activity in question, the forum state, by analysis of
the interests possessed by the states involved, could constitutionally apply to the decision of the case, the law of

one or another state having such an interest in the
3

activity.

31. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 97 L.Ed. 1211 (1953);
Hughes v. Fetter, id.; Stumberg, Torts and Conflict of Laws, 34 WASH.
L. REv. 388, 397 (1959).
32. Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws,
DuKE L. J. 171 (1959); Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law:
Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI L. REV. 9
(1958); Kramer, Interest and Policy Clashes in Conflict of Laws, 13
RUTGERS L. REv. 523 (1959); Hill, Governmental Interest and Policy
Clashes in Conflict of Laws, A Reply to Professor Currie, 27 U. CM L.
REv. 463, 474-479 (1960) ; but see Sumner, Choice of Law Rules: Deceased
or Revived?, 7 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1960).
33. Carrol v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 99 L.Ed. 1183 (1955); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 502, 83 L.Ed.
940, 945 (1939); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294
U.S. 532, 79 L.Ed. 1044 (1935); compare Bradford Elec. Co. v. Clapper,
286 U.S. 145, 76 L.Ed. 1026 (1932).
34. Stumberg, supranote 31.
35. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Co., 348 U.S. 66, 99 L.Ed. 74
(1954); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 89 L.Ed. 812
(1944).
36. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 97 L.Ed. 1211 (1953);
First Nat'l Bank v. United Airlines, 342 U.S. 396, 96 L.Ed. 441 (1952);
Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 95 L.Ed. 1212 (1951).
37. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 15, 7 L.Ed.2d 492, 501
(1962). This action arose out of an airplane crash in Missouri while en-
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Only in the field of fraternal benefit associations, 38 has
the Court adhered to its original position, seemingly ignoring
any weighing and balancing or analysis of the states' in39
terests.
Thus it appears that the courts are increasingly moving
from a strict application of the full faith and credit clause,
to that of a more liberal nature, and in each instance delving
into the merits of the particular case, as it should arise.
DEPARTURE FROM LEX LOCI DELICTI
In Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 40 the highest court
in New York in a dramatic departure from the rule of lex
loci delicti, stated by way of dictum that the limitation on
damages under the Massachusetts Wrongful Death Act might
not be applied in the courts of that state in an action for
wrongful death resulting from a plane crash in Massachusetts.
The court justified its reasoning on the grounds that
"[M]odern conditions make it unjust and anomalous to subject
traveling citizens of this state to the laws of other states, over
and through which they move." 41 The Massachusetts limitation was found to be violative of public policy and also to
concern the "procedural" law of New York.
There seems to be little doubt that the real basis of the
court's dictum was founded on the public policy of the state
of New York, yet it is evident that the court, in throwing off
route from Oklahoma to New York. The Court held that under the
Federal Tort Claims Act the conflict of law rules of the state where the
negligence occurred were applicable; thus Oklahoma's law, applying the
Missouri Wrongful Death Statute governed, and the representatives were
entitled to no further recovery. ($15,000 had already been recovered or
at least tendered in Missouri.)
38. E.g., Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586,
91 L.Ed. 1687 (1947); Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World v.
Bolin, 305 U.S. 66, 83 L.Ed. 45 (1938).
39. Another similar approach in the field of conflict of laws, which
merits mention, has led to what has come to be called the "grouping of
contacts" or "center of gravity" theory. Under this theory, the law of
the state having the most significant contacts with the transaction should
be applied. See Zogg. v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 276 F.2d 861
(2d Cir. 1960) ; Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99, 50 A.L.R.2d
264 (1954) ; but see Kramer, supra note 32 at 546, for a criticism of the
approach as a mechanical weighing with little attempt to weed out the
irrelevant factors; Currie, supra note 32, at 13 (describing the theory as
being amorphous in relation to the contacts).
40. 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961). This case arose out of
the same ill-fated flight as did Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309
F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962).
41. Id. at 135, 172 N.E.2d 526, 527 (1961).
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the shackles of the rigid view of lex loci delicti, felt compelled
to supplement their argument through the characterization of
42
the problem as being one of "procedural" law.
Regardless of the injection of the element of procedural law,
Kilberg, in effect, laid the foundation for what may properly
be defined as the final step toward the accomplishment of a
new era in the field of torts in conflict of laws.
LEX FORI
In Pearsonv. NortheastAirlines, Inc., 43 plaintiff's decedent,
a domicillary and citizen of New York perished in an airplane
crash in Massachusetts. Plaintiff, as administratrix of her
husband's estate, brought suit in the Southern District of
44
New York under the Massachusetts Wrongful Death Act;
federal jurisdiction resting on diversity of citizenship, plaintiff being a citizen and domicillary of New York and the Airlines being a Massachusetts corporation. Plaintiff obtained a
jury verdict of $160,204.65, the trial judge refusing to apply
the $15,000.00 limitation under the Massachusetts statute.
Judge McGohey, in so doing, ruled that he was obliged to
apply a dictum of the New York Court of Appeals in Kilberg
v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,45 to the effect that the Massachusetts limitation would not be enforced against a New York
citizen suing in a New York court. The court later denied
defendant's motion to strike pre-judgment interest. 46
42. That Kilberg " ... must be held merely to express New York's strong
public policy against limitations in wrongful death actions," see Davenport v. Webb, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17, 183 N.E.2d 902, 904 (1962).
43. 199 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
44. MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 229, §2 (1932): Damages for death by negligence of common carrier. If the proprietor of a common carrier of passengers . .. causes the death of a passenger, he or it shall be liable in
damages in the sum of not less than two thousand nor more than fifteen
thousand dollars, to be assessed with reference to the degree of culpability of the defendant or of his servants or agents, and recovered and
distributed as provided in section one, and to the use of the persons and
in the proportions, therein specified. (The statute was amended to raise
the upper limit of recovery to $20,000; MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 229, §2
(Supp. 1961); and effective January 1, 1963, the minimum recovery was
raised to $3,000.00 and the maximum to $30,000.00, MASS. AcTs, ch. 306
(1962).
45. 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961).
46. 201 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). The present discussion will be
limited to the controversial issue as to whether the New York Court is
required to apply the $15,000.00 limitation of liability for wrongful death
under the Massachusetts statute. In view of the decision in Pearson v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), and that of Davenport v. Webb, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17, 183 N.E.2d 902 (1962), it appears well
settled that the question of pre-judgment interest is to be determined by
Massachusetts law.
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In reversing and remanding, a panel of the court of appeals
for the second circuit, one judge dissenting, held that the trial
court's refusal to apply the $15,000.00 limitation under the
Massachusetts statute was a violation of the full faith and
credit clause of the United States Constitution.47 The court
also unanimously held that the lower court had erred in denying the motion to strike the pre-judgment interest. 48 The
majority opinion in reaching their decision, relied heavily on
0
Hughes v. Fetter,49 and FirstNat'l Bank v. United Airlines."
These cases, both of which involved wrongful death actions,
were dismissed by the respective state's courts due to the
forum's statutory policy against entertaining foreign wrongful
death actions. After a finding that neither forum had any
real antagonism toward wrongful death actions in general,.
for both entertained such actions arising in their own states,
the Supreme Court of the United States reversed both decisions as violating the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution.
The panel court, in analogizing these cases with Pearson,
stated that New York, likewise, had no antagonism to wrongful death actions in general, but only to the limitation of
liability.5' The majority seemingly found of little significance
those cases illustrating the Supreme Court's attitude toward
cases in which the law of the forum was applied in actions
involving multistate activities. These, the court found, were
52
distinguishable from the question before the court.
On rehearing en bane, the court of appeals, affirming the
decision of the district court, as modified by the panel's.
unanimous holding as to pre-judgment interest, held that the
New York court was not required to apply the $15,000.00
limitation under the Massachusetts statute, and that the run53
ning of interest should be determined by Massachusetts law.
47. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1962).
4S. See supra note 46.
49. 341 U.S. 609, 95 L.Ed. 1212 (1951).
50. 342 U.S. 396, 96 L.Ed. 441 (1952).
51. See 307 F.2d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1962). In Wells v. Simonds Abrasive

Co., 345 U.S. 514, 97 L.Ed. 1211 (1953), the Court, however, said the
crucial factor in Hughes and First National Bank was that the forum
laid an uneven hand on causes of action arising within and without the
forum state, resulting in discrimination against such foreign causes of
action.
52. See Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 307 F.2d 131, 135-13&
(2d Cir. 1962).
53. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962)
(6-3 decision), cert. denied, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3259 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1963)

(No. 694).
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The court, citing a United States Supreme Court case,
and two state supreme court cases, 5 adopted as its view, that
a state having substantial ties with the transaction in dispute
has a legitimate constitutional interest in the application of
its own rule of law,56 and further that a court could examine
each issue in the litigation weighing the contacts of the various
states involved, and shape its rules controlling the litigation
without interfering with the Constitution. 57
Confronted with the contention of due process, the court
stated that to constitute such a denial, there would have to be
the assertion that Northeast Airlines had a vested property
right in the application of the Massachusetts rule of liability
for wrongful death. In answer to this, the court stated that
no such right exists. 58 Not only must there be the deprivation
of property, but also the arbitrary application of a state's
jurisprudence to an out of state event.59 With this the majority concludes, nothing could be less arbitrary than the
decision it has made. 60

CONCLUSION
The decision in Pearsonis appealing to one's inherent sense
-of justice, but was such the proper one? The question is
whether the theory of weighing and balancing of the states'
interests should extend to the field of torts, or should it be
confined to those fields of conflict of laws in which it has
previously been applied.
It is submitted that among the various fields, there is little
difference in the underlying principle. Certainly one basic
task of conflict of laws is to provide methods of choice which
will facilitate the fair and sensible accommodation of conflicting state policies. 81 It becomes apparent that a rigid rule
54. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962).
55. Haunischild v. Continental Co., 7 Wis.2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959);
Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal.2d 859, 264 P.2d 944, 42 A.L.R.2d 1162 (1953).
56. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, 309 F.2d 553, 559 (2d Cir. 1962).
57. Id. at 561.
58. For the majority's explanation, see the dissenting opinion in Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 307 F.2d 131, 140-142 (2d Cir. 1962).
59. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553, 563 (2d Cir.
1962).
60. Ibid. In regard to the Massachusetts statute being penal in nature,
see Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198-200 (1918).
Justice Cardozo writing the majority opinion states that the statute is
not penal within the rules of private international law, its primary purpose being reparation to one aggrieved in tort.
61. Cavers, The Two "Local Law" Theories, 63 HARv. L. REv. 822, 828

(1950).
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mechanically applied to all torts must be inappropriate as according recognition to the true interests of the parties. Any
such mechanical jurisprudence is particularly unsuited in this
field. 12
Accordingly, while much may be said in favor of greater
elasticity in the rules of conflict of laws, 63 such can be accomplished only through the partial sacrifice of certain aspects
of the present rule. To an extent, uniformity would be so
affected. 4 But certainly the uniformity desired is not that of
the strict standard thought appropriate in the field of property. 5 While the importance of the parties knowing where
they stand is not to be taken lightly, yet in torts, certainty,
transactions in reliance on previous decisions, predictability
and the like are of less importance. 66 In the field of torts,
such actions concerning legal rights among the parties are
usually brought about through entirely fortuitous circumstances, normally not within the contemplation of the parties.
It has been contended that any change in the present view
could possibly bring about the disturbing aspect of forum
shopping. 67 This, it appears, is doubtful and at best, presents
a rather unpersuasive argument. The plaintiff will seldom
have the choice of more than two forums, and of these, the
chances are that there will be slight dissimilarity.
In less modern times, lex loci delicti may have been an appropriate rule, yet with the passing of time and the changing
of conditions, the need for a re-evaluation in the field of conflict of laws has become self-evident. The present theory, in
light of these changed conditions presents fully its obsolesence
if mechanically applied to a situation as in Pearson.
While it is true, that prior to Pearson,such deviation from
lex loci delicti was in a relatively early stage, Pearsonis the
logical and final step toward the culmination of a changing
pattern as evidenced by prior Supreme Court decisions.
Rather than resorting to specious reasoning for the decision,
62. Shuman & Prevezer, Torts, In English and American Conflict of
Laws: The Role of the Forum, 58 MicH. L. REv. 1067, 1071-1073 (1958).
63. See Childress, Toward the Proper Law of the Tort, 40 TEXAs L.
RE.V. 336 (1962).
64. Sumner, Choice of Law Rules: Deceased or Revived?, 7 U.C.L.A.

L. Rrv. 1 (1960).
65. See Childress, supra note 63, at 344.
66. Id. at 345.

67. See Sumner, supra note 66.
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as other courts have felt compelled to do, or worse, to mechanically apply the rule of lex loci delicti, the court in Pearson was able to give frank recognition to the social, economic,
and other governmental interests which were held to necessitate the application of New York law. Through such an
analysis, there can be no contention that the all encompassing
term of public policy has been used to conceal the true factors
in the decision, or that such decision represents a blind intuitive grasping by a judge to reach what appears to him
to be the just result."" To the contrary, the underlying reasons
of public policy are brought forth to light, and as such compel
the decision of the case.
Analysis of the interests among the states, while advocated
by many of the scholars of today,60 has been tempered to some
degree by those who propose that such should not be within
the province of the courts, but rather should be dealt with
by Congress.7 The argument is founded on the ground that
the courts are limited in that their basic source of information will be supplied primarily from the opposing parties,
while Congress, through a more thorough investigation could
more accurately determine which of the conflicting interests
is paramount. While this at first glance, may seem quite
plausible, it is submitted that after further consideration, such
proposal loses much of its luster. To begin with, this would
certainly necessitate a long range undertaking by Congress,
and even upon the final decision, the problem of a strict and
rigid rule, unsuitable to conditions in later years might well
be presented. Then, too, it would seem rather idealistic to say
that such decision would be free of the various political pressures so often brought to bear upon members of Congress
in questions of such importance. From the more practical
viewpoint, the weighing and balancing or analysis of the interests should more appropriately be left in the hands of the
courts.
Assuming then, that lex loci delicti is outmoded, and that
the proper approach was used by the en banc session, the question remains as to whether the final decision as reached by
68. See Kramer, supra note 32, at 527.

69. Supra note 32.
70. See Currie, supra note 32; Kramer, supra note 32; but see Hill,
supra note 32; Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society,
1956 ILL. L. REv. 230, 234; Traynor, Conflict of Laws: Professor Currie's
Restrained and Enlightened Forum, 49 CALIF. L. Rnv. 845 (1961).
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the court's analysis was correct. There can be little doubt that
a true conflict of laws question was presented. On the one
hand, there is New York's strong public policy against limitation on damages as expressed by its statute;71 while on the
other, there is Massachusetts' interest in protecting the corporations of her state against such unlimited liability.7 2
It is submitted that the interests of New York outweigh
those of Massachusetts, and that the law of the forum should
be applied. The Airlines, a corporation authorized to do business in the state of New York, maintains ticket offices
throughout the state, and as such, a substantial portion of
revenue is derived from the state. Decedent, a New York
citizen and domicillary, purchased his flight tickets in one
of the ticket offices in New York. The plaintiff, widow and
administratrix of the estate of the deceased, likewise is a
citizen and domiciliary of the state of New York. From such
a factual situation, the interests of New York are evident.
As to whether New York's interest is paramount, certainly
it may be said that New York has a legitimate interest in
the welfare of her citizens. Assuming plaintiff's source of
income destroyed, it may well become the responsibility of
New York state in financially providing for her. It would appear ridiculous to even assume that the amount of damages as
provided in the Massachusetts statute, even though considered
sufficient by the standards of Massachusetts, could likewise be
considered sufficient in another state, as New York, whose
social and economic environment could well be quite different.
Under these circumstances, Massachusetts' interests in the
protection of her corporations should give way. It is unlikely that the decision will impair Massachusetts' position
as the state of incorporation of Northeast Airlines in any
way. The limitation of damages as provided by the Massachusetts statute would hardly seem to be the motivating
factor, if any, in the Airlines' choice of the state of incorporation. Northeast Airlines, most assuredly contemplated doing
business in other states which would not have such limited
liability; and in such actions, as the present, the ultimate
liability rests on the insurance carrier.
71. N.Y. CONST. art. I, §16 (1894).
72. Supra note 44.
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To make the amount of damages depend on the fortuitous
place of the wrong presents fully, that which is both absurd
and unjust.
Pearson,in its departure from lex loci delicti has reached
the proper and just decision, and hopefully such decision will
provide a firm foundation for a more practical approach in
the field of torts in conflict of laws.
MICHAEL H. QUINN
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